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Introduction 
This article describes the general evolution of 
the present developing country debt problem 
and discusses some of the current efforts to deal 
with it.' 
In a nutshell, the problem since 1982 has been 
that many debtor nations in the developing world 
have interrupted their normal external debt ser- 
vice from time to time and, in most instances, 
have had to rely on reschedulings and loans of 
additional funds from both commercial banks 
and official sources to maintain debt service. 
Because of both the larger quantities of funds 
involved and the commitment of new commer- 
cial bank loans to assist the adjustment process, 
the current methods of debt resolution stand 
apart from prior balance of payments adjustment 
programs in the post-World War I1 era. 
During the 1970s and early 1980s, the claims 
of United States banks on developing countries 
(also called "lesser developed countries," or 
"LDCs"), increased rapidly. The LDC debts raised 
difficult issues that have troubled borrowers, 
lenders, creditor country governments, and offi- 
cial multilateral lending agencies since the scope 
of the debt problem became clear in 1982. 
8  1  Adjustments in debtor economies or  among foreign bank creditors are 
beyond the scope of this article. See  Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 
Annwl Report  1987,  for discussion of  these aspects of  the LDC debt problem. 
Initially, lenders and their governments 
believed that restructured and rescheduled lend- 
ing by creditors, and domestic policy adjust- 
ments by debtors, would be sufficient to resolve 
the debt problem in a reasonable period of time. 
Now, however, more than five years have passed 
and the debt problem is still unresolved. 
Although economic conditions in the debtor 
countries may have improved somewhat from 
their 1982-1984 low point, by a number of objec- 
tive criteria several important debtor countries 
seem little closer to being able to service their 
debts on an ongoing basis than was the case five 
years ago. 
From the perspective of the U.S. banking sys- 
tem, an important characteristic of the LDC debt 
problem is the distribution of the debt among 
U.S. banking firms. By June 1987, nine money- 
center banks held 66 percent of all U.S. banks' 
claims on 15 heavily indebted countries, includ- 
ing the most heavily indebted Iatin American 
co~ntries.~  In addition, those claims were equiva- 
8  2  The  15 heavily indebted countries are: Argentina ($9.1), Bolivia ($0.1) 
Brazil ($23.0), Chile  ($6.2), Colombia ($2.0), Cote d' lvoire ($0.4), Ecuador 
($1.9), Mexico ($23.6), Morocco ($0.8),  Nigeria ($0.6),  Peru ($1.1),  Philippines 
($4.8), Uruguay ($0.9),  Venezeula ($8.4), and Yugoslavia ($1.9). The amounts 
of all U.S. banks' claims on those countries, as of  June 30, 1987, are indicated 
in parentheses (amounts in billions). In late 1987,  Costa Rica (about  $4M) mil- 
lion) and Jamaica (about $200 million), also were added to the official sche- 
dule of heavily indebted countries. 
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1.  Iatin America includes OPEC members Ecuador and Venezuela, but 
excludes Panama, the Bahamas, and other offshore (Caribbean) banking 
centers. 
SOURCES: Federal Reserue Bulletins (Table 3.21 ). 
lent to 113 percent of the total capital of the nine 
money-center banks. By comparison, bank claims 
on this same group of countries were equivalent 
to 64 percent of the total capital of 13 other large 
regional banks, and 27  percent of the total capi- 
tal of all other U.S. banks. 
I.  Beginnings 
U.S. banks' lending to Iatin America increased rap- 
idly during the 1970s and early 1980s. Although 
the data are not strictly comparable for different 
time periods, U.S. banks' claims on all of Latin 
America rose from $8 billion at year-end 1973 to 
$84.8 billion at year-end 1982. Despite a modest 
amount of new-money lending to rescheduling 
countries since 1982, claims on Iatin America 
were reduced to $83.9 billion by June 1987 and 
$82.3 billion by September 1987 (table 
3  Sources: Federal ReSe~e  Bulletins, Table 3.18,  display claims of all 
U.S, banks on foreigners. Beginning in 1976, a new series was started: claims 
on foreign countries held by U.S. banking offices and foreign branches of  U.S. 
banks. This series, Table 3.21, pertains only to  U.S.-chartered banks, while 
Table 3.18 data pertain to all banks in the United States, including U.S. offices 
of foreign banks. To obtain figures for Latin America using Table 3.21 data, 
one must add claims for all of Latin America, plus Latin American OPEC 
members Venezuela and Ecuador. 
While foreign borrowings from U.S. banks 
increased rapidly from 1971 through 1973, an 
enormous increase in LDC  debt materialized 
after the first oil-price shock (October-December 
1973), possibly because of the methods used to 
cope with greatly increased capital outflows from 
oil-importing countries.* Initially, the expanded 
debt levels seemed acceptable to many creditors 
and debtors because the rate of increase of eco- 
nomic growth in many large debtor economies 
exceeded the rate of increase in their external 
debt levels.5 
How far in advance lenders foresaw the Mexi- 
can debt difficulties in midyear 1982 is not clear. 
However, at least some lenders were caught 
unaware-at least one new, large, syndicated 
loan for Mexico, worth $100 million or more, 
still was being offered to lenders in July and 
August 1982. Banks' lending to Mexico acceler- 
ated until the onset of its payment difficulties- 
$6.4 billion of new Mexican debt was added into 
the $84 billion final total, before rescheduling, 
during the first six months of 1982 alone.6 
A number of developments unforeseen by the 
borrowers or lenders suddenly disrupted the 
servicing of the LDC  loans. The sharp recession 
and the onset of disinflation in 1982 certainly are 
among the foremost precipitating factors for the 
August 1982 crisis. The dramatic decline in infla- 
tion during the first half of 1982 reduced bor- 
rowers' planned receipts and increased their 
demand for credit to maintain living standards. 
The extraordinary increase in interest rates that 
preceded the July 1981 to November 1982 reces- 
sion also was a factor contributing to the crisis. 
Dollar interest rates were above prior post-World 
War 11 levels throughout the period. The prime 
4  See, for example, Margaret Garritsen De  Vries, The IMF  in a Changing 
World (1986). Data on U.S. banks' foreign claims in Federal  Reserve Bulletins, 
Table 3.18,  indicale thal U.S. banks' claims on foreign borrowers increased 
nearly 75 percent in 1974 alone; claims on  Latin American bwrowers increased 
90 per cent in 1974 alone. Tolal foreign lending of  U.S.  banks increased $19.7 
billion during 1974, and loans lo Latin America constituted $7.1  billion (36 per- 
cent) of the increase. Other historians maintain that the seeds of  the impetus 
for expanded foreign lending by  U.S.  banks were sown by the stimulus of the 
domestic economy by U.S. fiscal and monetaly authorities in 1970-1972. 
E 5  Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Annual Report 1987.  Thus,  Ihe 
Annual Report maintains, debt-service capacity increased at a rate that 
seemed to be consistent with future debt-service requirements. See  "Devel- 
opmenls in International Financial Markets," 1975 Federal Resewe Bulletin 
605-617, for a tacit, official acceptance of the use of bank intermediaries for 
petrodollar recycling in the 1970s. 
6  Harold Lever and Christopher Huhne. Debt and Danger:  The  World 
hnancial Crisis. 49-52 (1985, 1986). U.S. banks' exposure to Mexico increased 
by $3.5  billion in the first six months of 1982, a 32.4 percent annual rate of 
increase. 1983 Federal Resewe Bulletin A 63 (Table 3.21) (January 1983). 
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in August 1981 (monthly average), still was at 15 
percent on August 15, 1982 .'  A large proportion 
of the LDC  loans was negotiated at floating 
interest rates, with frequent interest rate fixing 
dates. Although these practices allowed LDCs to 
hedge against anticipated declines in interest 
rates, increasing amounts of debt had to be 
rolled over at increasingly shorter intervals. 
11.  Confronting 
the  Problem 
Following the onset of Mexico's payment difficul- 
ties, in mid-August 1982, with only rare excep- 
tions, the flow of voluntary, new-money lending 
to the heavily indebted countries gradually 
stopped. For a time, sovereign debt service prob- 
lems were managed, on a country-by-country 
basis. Brazil still could roll over maturing short- 
term foreign bank credits until early December 
1982, but then Brazil also temporarily stopped 
paying interest due on its loans, interrupting its 
debt service due to what was considered a "short- 
term liquidity crisis."  One by one,  Argentina, Vene- 
zuela, and eventually every continental country 
in Latin America, except Colombia and Paraguay, 
interrupted its foreign debt service. Each of those 
countries arranged reschedulings or restructurings 
of its external debt, usually under the auspices of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
The initial approach to resolving Mexico's pay- 
ments difficulties in 1982 contained several 
novel elements, such as a substantial amount of 
new-money lending by banks, together with cus- 
tomary IMF assistance and a three-year adjust- 
ment program. 
After the program was implemented in Febru- 
ary 1983, analysts began to observe that a pattern 
of continued real growth in the industrial econ- 
omies of 3 percent per year would enable signifi- 
cant improvements in the LDCs' debt-service ca- 
pacities to occur and identified real growth in the 
industrial economies as the most important inter- 
national influence on the LDCs' debt positi~n.~ 
7  1983 Federal Resewe Bulletin A 27 (Table 1.33)  (January 1983). The 
prime rate was cul to 14.5 percent on August 16,  1982. 
At  the same time, U.S. economic policy stimu- 
lated domestic economic growth aggressively 
through both fiscal and monetary measures, a 
development that, among other economic policy 
objectives, encouraged imports from the LDCs, 
who reciprocally were reducing their own im- 
ports from industrial economies,  thereby enabling 
the LDCs to maintain their external debt service. 
U.S. authorities also encouraged other industrial 
countries to stimulate their economies, partly in 
order to facilitate LDC  debt service, but such 
stimulation was comparatively slow in coming, 
due to concerns about renewed inflation abroad. 
The 1982-85  era was a period in which debt- 
ors negotiated the first round of adjustments 
necessary for redressing their external-account 
imbalances and made significant progress 
toward that goal. The reschedulings were a 
necessary component of the official effort to buy 
time to enable the debtor countries to complete 
the adjustments required to service the debt. The 
adjustments were extremely difficult and, in 
many instances, caused cutbacks in the degree of 
longstanding and highly developed state involve- 
ment in, and subsidization of, domestic econo- 
mies in countries like Mexico, Brazil, and Argen- 
tina.9 The reschedulings, however, have 
continued down to the present in most debtor 
countries, including a few repeat reschedulings 
of principal for which the grace periods under 
earlier reschedulings expired. 
New loans extended in connection with 
reschedulings allowed LDC  debtors to keep 
interest payments current after mid- 1982. They 
also increased the outstanding principal owed by 
debtors to the creditors. The foreign debts of 
Mexico and Brazil (that is, debt for all classes of 
borrowers owed to all classes of foreign credi- 
tors), for example, increased from approximately 
$80 billion each in mid-1982 to $105 billion for 
Mexico and $114 billion for Brazil at midyear 
1987, with very little in the way of new, usable 
funds provided in the interim. External debt as a 
percentage of exports of goods and services of 
the heavily indebted countries increased from 
33.5 percent in 1980 to 46.3 percent in 1982 and 
60.8 percent in 1986.10 
Another purpose of the reschedulings and 
new-money loans was to provide enough time 
for orderly adjustments in the creditor countries, 
especially within their banking systems. The 
8  See  Bergsten, C.  Fred, William R.  Cline, and John Williamson. Bank  W  9  For  a description of  the types of debtor-country adjustments lhat were 
Lending to Developing Countries:  The  Policy Alternatives 7,  18,  Institute for  made, see Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Annual Report 1987. 
lntemalional Economics, 10 Policy Analysis in International Economics (April 
1985).  10  World Bank, 1 World Debt  Tables:  1987-1988, xiv, 33 (1988). 
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1982  1987  1982  1987  1982  1987 
Nine large money-center banks  54.3  56.3  27.1  49.8  -  630.0 
Thirteen other large banks  17.9  14.8  12.7  23.1  -  284.0 
All other banks (excluding 22 banks above)  18.0  14.1  26.4  51.4  -  679.0 
Total (All U.S. banks)2  90.2  84.8  66.2  124.4  -  1,593.0 
1.  The 15 countries are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, Ecuador, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, 
Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. Amounts in billions of dollars as of June 30, 1982 and June 30, 1987. 
2.  The number of reporting banks was 167 in June 1982; 181 in June 1987. 
NOTE: Totals may not agree due to rounding. 
SOURCE: FFlEC Statistical Releases No. E. 16 (126), Country Exposure Lending Survey. Exposures are adjusted for guarantees and external 
borrowings. 
condition of the nine large U.S. money-center 
banks with the greatest exposures to 15 heavily 
indebted countries is shown in table 2. Their 
exposure ($54.3 billion) in June 1982 was 
approximately twice their total capital ($27.1 bil- 
lion). Also, that exposure constituted about 60 
percent of the total claims of all U.S. banks on 
those 15 countries ($90.2 billion). 
The concentrated exposure in the largest U.S. 
banks raised questions about the capacity of the 
entire U.S. banking system to withstand the 
shock of the default of a single large debtor or 
the coordinated defaults of a group of debtors." 
Also, four large Iatin American debtors (Mexico, 
Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela) account for 
three-fourths of all U.S. banks' claims on the 
heavily indebted countries. 
Such concerns prompted additional efforts to 
ensure the soundness of banking conditions. For 
some time prior to 1981, banks' capital adequacy 
had been a matter of increased supervisory con- 
cern. The International Lending Supervision Act 
(ILSA), enacted in November 1983, directed U.S. 
bank supervisory authorities to monitor the for- 
eign lending activities of U.S. banks and to study 
the need for capital increases and new loan-loss 
reserves because of those activities. The U.S. bank 
supervisory authorities proposed increased min- 
imum capital ratios in July 1984, requiring pri- 
mary capital of 5.5 percent and total capital of 6.0 
percent for member banks and bank holding 
companies.12 
In fact, as table 2 shows, the capital positions 
of all banks have improved substantially since 
1982-both absolutely and in relation to LDC 
debt. The large regional banks reduced their 
LDC  debt exposures slightly and nearly doubled 
their total capital from 1982 until 1987. During 
1986 and 1987, there were particularly large in- 
creases in both primary capital and total capital 
of the 34 largest bank holding companies (see 
table 3). 
If  rescheduling and new-money loans acted to 
increase debts for the debtors and the loans out- 
standing for many creditors, the net effect of 
those measures was, in many cases, to retard the 
progress of those creditors in adjusting their bal- 
ance sheets in the direction of greater stability. 
Thus, the resulting LDC  debt exposure of U.S. 
banks, on a scale that constitutes a potentially 
serious difficulty, remains concentrated increas- 
ingly in the money-center banks, together with 
one or two large regional banks. 
After the initial round of reschedulings in 1982- 
84, a generally improved world economic outlook 
encouraged those who believed that the new- 
money-lending approach would work satisfactor- 
ily. In fact, much progress occurred. Even though 
domestic inflation never really was controlled in 
12  See Federal Rese~e  System Board of Governors, Annual Report  I984 
11 For  accounts of official statements on  the "too big to let fail" prob-  at 177.  The 1981 minimum capital ratios for large bank holding companies had 
lem, see Sprague, l~ine  H., Bailout 259 (1986) (remarks attributed to a former  been established at 5.0 percent (primary capital) and 5.5 percent (total capital). 
Comptroller of  the Currency and to a former director of the Federal Deposit  ILSA is Pub.  L.  No.  98-181, Title IX, Nov. 30, 1983; codified at  12 U.S.C.A. 
Insurance Corporation). Cf  Lever and Huhne at 17-22.  sections 3901-3912. 
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Bank of New York  $231  $319  $272  $335 
Bankers Trust NY  472  1,271  538  1,152 
Chase Manhattan  571  987  706  1,441 
Chemical NY 
Citicorp 
Irving Bank Corp. 
Manufacturers Hanover 
J.P. Morgan & Co. 
Marine Midland 
Republic NY  Corp. 
Bank of Boston Corp. 
First Chicago 
Money Center Composite 
Large California Banks 
BankAmerica Corp.  24  679  339  722 
First Interstate  369  291  267  14 
Security Pacific  616  1,631  1,210  2,080 
Wells Fargo  1,133  495  1,760  275 
SOURCES: Salomon Brothers; and American Banker. 
either Mexico or Brazil, exports were stimulated, 
imports were reduced by more than one-half in 
Mexico, and enough new-money loans were pro- 
vided to cover debt-service needs. By  early 1985, 
Mexico and Brazil had accumulated modest or, 
in Brazil's case, significant surpluses in their 
trade balances (up to $10 billion per year). 
At  the IMF-World Bank annual meeting in 
Seoul, Korea, in October 1985, U.S. Treasury 
Secretary  James k  Baker revealed what is now 
known as the Baker Plan for the LDC  debt crisis. 
Moving beyond the initial, three-year IMF auster- 
ity regimes for debtors, Secretary Baker urged 
banks to continue providing enough new-money 
loans to stimulate real growth in LDC  econo- 
mies,  "in addition to merely lending enough to 
meet debt-service requirements. In return, eligi- 
ble LDC  debtors (the "15 heavily indebted" 
countries) were to strengthen the foundation for 
long-term growth and eventual debt service by 
adopting  market-oriented reforms of domestic 
policies, including extensive privatization of 
state-owned enterprises, and elimination of 
some producer and consumer subsidies. About 
$20 billion of new-money loans, net of repay- 
ments, over a three-year period were called for. 
A number of debtors, including Argentina and 
Brazil, agreed to the principal Baker Plan-style 
reforms, and renewed attempts to control their 
domestic inflation. In January and February 1986, 
Argentina and Brazil adopted the Austral and Cru- 
zado plans, respectively,  which included sweep- 
ing currency reforms, wage and price freezes, and 
initial reductions in domestic inflation. Mexico 
was pursuing a modified version of the 1982 IMF 
austerity regime and experienced modest net 
inflows of capital in 1986 and early 1987. 
Ill.  Economic  Conditions 
of  LDC Countries 
The initial successes of the chosen approach to 
the LDC  debt crisis eventually were impaired by 
persistent and increasing domestic inflation and 
large domestic budget deficits, especially in the 
largest heavily indebted countries. Debt-export 
and debt-service-export ratios remained 
burdensome. 
In 1982, real gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth in the 15 heavily indebted countries 
averaged about zero percent, inflation averaged 
nearly 60 percent, domestic budget deficits were 
more than five percent of GDP, the aggregate 
current-account deficit totaled about $50 billion, 
the debt-export ratio was close to 270 percent, 
and the debt-service export ratio was about 50 
percent (table 4). As the data in table 4 indicate, 
economic conditions in the aggregate have 
improved in a number of respects since the 
1982-1984  period. Real GDP growth, budget 
deficits and the current-account balance all 
improved by varying degrees. 
Yet, it is clear from the data that inflation 
remains severe and debt burdens have 
increased, despite the fact that debt-service obli- 
gations (interest payments and principal amorti- 
zations expressed as percentages) have moder- 
ated somewhat from their 1982 peak values. And 
it is also clear that, despite some improvements 
since 1982, economic conditions in the heavily 
indebted countries are far from healthy today. 
Improvements in the aggregate trade balance, a 
key source of foreign-exchange earnings, slowed 
during the past two years. Though some eco- 
nomic improvements have occurred since the 
worst of the crisis, and though debtor countries 
and lenders have worked hard at improving the 
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a.  Compound annual rates of change unless otherwise noted. 
b. Gross domestic product. 
c. Ratio of debt or debt-service payments to exports of  goods and services. 
na -  not available. 
SOURCE: World Bank,  World Debt tables: 1987-1988 (  1988). 
situation, the debt burden remains enormous 
even five years after the crisis began. 
IV.  Implications  for  U.S. 
Banking Conditions 
Since 1974, stock-market values of U.S. money- 
center banks' shares have usually been priced 
well below book values. Since 1982, money- 
center banks' shares have been priced even 
more substantially below book values, appar- 
ently because investors in financial markets eval- 
uated LDC  loans at less than their nominal value. 
By year-end 1986, oil prices in Mexico fell as 
low as  $9 per barrel, Mexican foreign-exchange re- 
serves were at negligible levels, and the difficul- 
ties surrounding Argentina's Austral and Brazil's 
Cruzado plans were overwhelming. The stabili- 
zation programs that the debtors pursued relied 
heavily on nonmarket-oriented wage and price 
controls. Brazil suspended foreign-exchange 
interest payments to conserve foreign currency 
reserves in February 1987, and Argentina under- 
took negotiations for a new-money loan and 
rescheduling later in the year to compensate for 
shortfalls in the Austral plan. 
In March 1987, apparently in response to con- 
cerns regarding Brazilian and certain other LDC 
debts, the nation's largest commercial bank hold- 
ing company announced that it had put $3.9 bil- 
lion of LDC  loans on a "cash" accrual basis. 
Then, in May 1987, it announced the creation of 
up to $3 billion of loan-loss reserves for LDC 
debt, about 25 percent of its current LDC  expo- 
sure. Within a week, its common equity share 
value increased $5 per share, about 9 percent of 
prior share value. Other bank holding companies 
followed suit in May and June 1987, including, in 
all, 43 of the 50 largest bank holding companies 
in the United States, as of June 30, 1987. 
The amount of loan-loss reserves, which usu- 
ally had been between 1 and 2 percent of total 
loans at the largest banks before 1986, became 
comparatively large, in the range of 3 to 5 per- 
cent. Table 5 shows loan-loss reserves as a per- 
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Best available copyName of  Bank 
Holding Company  1982  1983  1984 
Ten Largest 
Bankers Trust 
New York Corp.  1.11  1.17  1.55 
BankAmerica Corp.  0.88  1.25  1.18 
Chase Manhattan Corp.  1.00  1.01  1.23 
Chemical New York Corp.  1 .00  1.10  1.22 
Citicorp  0.76  0.83  0.88 
First Interstate Bancorp.  1.20  1.35  1.34 
Manufacturers Hanover Corp.  0.74  0.90  1.08 
Morgan 0.P) & Co.  1.15  1.48  1.63 
Security Pacific Corp.  1.07  1.11  1.57 
Wells Fargo & Co.  0.93  0.96  1.14 
Ten largest Average  0.93  1.08  1.20 
Weighted averages (except for 12-31-87). 
SOURCE: Call Reports and Salomon Brothers. 
centage of total loans, from 1982 to 1987. The 
new loan-loss reserve ratios are significantly 
larger than historical ratios in the last 15 years. 
The round of special LDC  loan provisioning 
initiated in early 1987, however, did not play 
itself out by midyear. More LDC  loan-loss provi- 
sioning occurred at year-end 1987, including a 
general move toward 50 percent provisioning at 
most U.S. regional banks and three of the 10 
largest banks. Ongoing payments arrears in 
Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru, together with particu- 
lar uncertainties in other heavily indebted coun- 
tries, generally were cited as the reason for the 
increased provisioning. In December 1987, one 
large U.S. regional bank took the first actual 
charge-offs of a portion of its LDC  loans to a 
major debtor country, and at least two large 
regional banks with prior LDC  debt exposure 
became 100 percent reserved for it in January 
1988. The remaining seven largest U.S. banks 
have reserved thus far against approximately 25 
percent of their LDC  debt exposure. 
Banks have added to capital and increased 
reserves. Generally, apart Erom the largest New 
York City banks and one large California bank, 
reserves are more or less in line with market eval- 
uations of the debts of the 15 heavily indebted 
countries. The 1987 rounds of special provisions 
for LDC  debt were taken almost entirely from the 
equity accounts (paid-in, common-share capital, 
perpetual preferred shares, plus retained earn- 
ings or surplus) of the bank holding companies. 
Because 100 percent of the LDC  loan-loss provi- 
sions still count as primary supervisory capital, 
the primary capital ratios of the bank holding 
companies have not been weakened, but the 
equity capital ratios are as low as they have been 
since the early 1980s, typically between 2 and 4 
percent of total assets at the largest companies 
where the bulk of the remaining LDC  exposure 
is concentrated. 
The future exclusion of the new loan-loss 
reserves from primary (Tier 1) capital for super- 
visory capital adequacy purposes, however, 
seems likely to cause banks to attempt to rebuild 
equity capital.13  Under the proposed interna- 
tional guidelines, 4 percent would be  the even- 
tual norm for equity capital, by 1992. 
13  See,  for  example, Bennett, Robert A,, "Hard Times for Three  Big 
Banks."  New York  Times,  April 10,  1988, section 3,  at 1,  col. 2 (national edi- 
tion). Future treatment of  loan-loss reserves as a part  of bank  capital is dis- 
cussed in a 17-nation agreement released December 10,  1987. Bank for Inter- 
national Settlements, Basle Committee on  Banking Regulation and Supervisory 
Practices, "Proposals for  lntemalional Convergence of  Capital Measurement 
and Capital Slandards," Dec. 10,  1987.  The  Federal ReSe~e  System's Board 
of  Governors approved publication for comment on  capital adequacy standards 
generally conforming with Ihe December 10, 1987 document on January 25, 
1988.  The  joint, federal bank  supervisory aulhorities' capital adequacy proposal 
was published in 53 Federal Register 8550-8587 (March 15, 1988). 
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Best available copy1982  1983  1984  1985 
Bank of New York  32.2%  1.09  30.5%  1.16  29.5%  1.26  32.9%  1.40 
Bankers Trust NY  27.1  1.05  27.4  1.15  26.5  1.26  25.6  1.38 
Chase Manhattan  44.0  1.70  31.9  1.75  40.5  1.83  29.7  1.90 
Chemical NY  34.2  1.92  34.1  2.16  36.4  2.36  33.8  2.48 
Citicorp  30.7  1.72  29.0  1.88  31.9  2.06  31.7  2.26 
Irving Bank Corp.  36.8  1.68  36.2  1.76  36.0  1.84  31.9  1.96 
Manufacturers Hanover  37.9  2.95  36.7  3.07  44.5  3.17  38.3  3.21 
J.P. Morgan & Co.  36.6  0.87  35.9  0.95  33.8  1.03  28.9  1.13 
Marine Midland  28.4  1.29  28.9  1.40  38.4  1.60  28.9  1.75 
Republic NY Corp.  26.5  0.93  27.7  1.01  29.2  1.07  27.4  1.09 
Bank of Boston Corp.  29.6  0.66  29.3  0.72  28.1  0.78  29.1  0.82 
First Chicago  36.0  1.20  32.1  1.26  110.9  1.32  46.5  1.32 
Money-Center Median  33.2%  31.2%  34.9%  30.7% 
BankAmerica Corp.  58.5  1.52  69.7  1.52  85.9  1.52  nm  1.16 
First Interstate  39.6  2.12  38.5  2.22  37.7  2.32  36.0  2.46 
Security Pacific  30.0  0.98  30.2  1.09  30.3  1.20  30.1  1.31 
Wells Fargo & Co.  33.1  0.96  32.9  0.99  31.6  1.08  29.9  1.24 
Regional-Bank Median  37.0%  35.6%  34.8%  30.4% 
(includes 22 banks) 
35-Bank ~edian~  35.1%  33.4%  34.9%  30.6% 
a. Common dividends declared per share, divided by net income per share on a primary basis. 
b. Average of  subgroup medians. 
c. Stock split during year is dividend = $1.35/share, $2.70 on prior basis. 
nm = not meaningful. 
nr  = not reported. 
SOURCE: Salomon Brothers. 
Alternative Solutions That 
Have Been Pursued 
Three large bank holding companies 
announced new common equity issues 
during 1987, and other large bank holding 
companies are said to be considering such 
issues to raise equity accounts. Only two of 
the 15-largest bank holding companies had 
new common equity issues in 1986, which 
were the first significant new common 
equity issues by the largest bank holding 
companies since 1982.  . Banks also may have to reexamine divi- 
dend policies if  they wish to rebuild equity 
accounts through retained earnings. The 
dividends per share declared by eight of 
the 10-largest bank holding companies 
increased each year from 1982 through 
1986. Prior to year-end 1987, every major 
New York City bank holding company 
increased its declared dividend each year 
since August 1982. The dividend payout 
ratio (dividends as a proportion of net 
income per share) essentially was 
unchanged at most of the largest bank 
holding companies over the 1982-1986 
period (see table 6). 
Generally, New York City banks increased 
their declared dividends as reported earn- 
ings rose during that period. Low equity 
capital ratios of most large bank holding 
companies, caused by the LDC  loan-loss 
reserves created in 1987, are likely to 
prompt the largest bank holding compan- 
ies to reconsider their policies on declared 
dividends, or at least to consider reducing 
their dividend payout ratios, in order to 
build up the equity capital ratios through 
retained earnings. 
Debt-for-equity swaps are frequently men- 
tioned for improving banks' capacity to 
manage the payments arrears problem on 
LDC  debt. Debt-for-equity swaps are 
exchanges of LDC  debt, usually at dis- 
counts from par value, for equal value (in 
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ments in enterprises operating within the 
debtor country. Regulations allowing U.S. 
banks and Edge or Agreement corporations 
to own equities in foreign, nonbanking 
businesses have been liberalized twice in 
the last year. 
Debt-for-equity swaps may be useful vehi- 
cles in particular circumstances but have 
only limited capability to resolve the over- 
all LDC debt problem because of the limited 
availability of enterprises suitable for debt- 
for-equity conversion in many LDCs. Some 
analysts have noted that, in the past, debt- 
for-equity swaps have substituted for capi- 
tal flows (direct investments) that might 
have occurred anyhow, without the 
inducement of discounted exchanges for 
local equity. Such exchanges might reduce 
the debtor's net external resources below 
the expected level that would have been 
available otherwise. Domestic inflation also 
may be increased to the extent that new 
domestic credit is created to accommodate 
the exchange of local currency for external 
debt in connection with the swap. 
Securitization, another frequently men- 
tioned LDC  debt option, generally is 
understood to mean the packaging of debt, 
usually with a payment guarantee provided 
by the issuer (seller) of fractional shares of 
the packaged debt. Securitization appears 
to offer only limited value as a long-term 
solution to the LDC  debt crisis because the 
debt being offered is considered by many 
analysts to be of speculative value and 
could not satisfy institutional investors' 
"prudent man" fiduciary standards without 
sellers' or third parties' payment guaran- 
tees. Most analysts believe that debt-for- 
equity swaps and securitization have a use- 
ful, but limited, role to play in the LDC 
debt-adjustment process. 
A secondary market for LDC  debt devel- 
oped in London shortly after the 1982 crisis 
began. It began initially as a device for 
repositioning LDC  debt exposures among 
institutional creditors. That market has 
increased in depth and volume and has 
expanded to New York. Although this 
market still is incapable of dealing with 
more than modest amounts of LDC  debt in 
an orderly fashion, the estimated volume 
of trading in 1987 reached $12 billion per 
year (par value). Estimated volume in this 
market is about 50 percent above 1987 
levels thus far in 1988. Representative bid 
prices for LDC  debt in April 1988 were as 
follows: Brazil (49.5 percent), Argentina 
(28 percent), Mexico (51 percent), and 
Venezuela (54.25 percent). 
Thus, as with the alternatives mentioned 
above, outright sales of LDC  debt in the 
secondary market offer limited opportunity 
at present for easing the strains of the LDC 
debt crisis. The market is so small that any 
offer of a large quantity of a country's debt 
depresses bid prices dramatically,  and the 
sale of debt at market prices clearly would 
require sellers to recognize extensive losses 
on the debts thus sold under current ac- 
counting standards. Also, from the debtors' 
perspectives, the secondary market often 
does not ease the strains because the dis- 
count from par value may not be captured 
by the debtors-they often remain obli- 
gated to repay at par value, even after the 
sale is completed. 
Another important development occurred 
in late December 1987, when J.P. Morgan & 
Company, the U.S. Treasury, and the Mexi- 
can government separately made state- 
ments announcing a proposed auction ar- 
rangement under which Mexican debt held 
by banks would be exchanged for Mexican 
government 20-year bonds.'*  Bids in the 
auction were expected by many to enable 
Mexico to exchange $1 of bonds for a great- 
er amount of debt, perhaps as many as $2. 
The repayment of principal (after 20 
years) was to be assured by Mexico's pur- 
chase of a new issue of U.S. Treasury, zero- 
coupon, 20-year securities for between $2 
billion and $2.5 billion. The principal value 
of the U.S. bonds at maturity was to be be- 
tween $10 billion and $11 billion at current 
interest rates and was to enable Mexico to 
extinguish up to $20 billion of bank debt. 
The actual results of the auction were 
not as encouraging as many had expected. 
Although active participation in the auction 
was expected from regional and foreign 
banks, it was not expected from most 
money-center banks. The participation of 
14  See  Bennett, Robert A,, "Big Bank  Proposes a Plan for Easing Third- 
World Debt." New  York Times, December 30,  1987, at Al, col. 6 (late city 
edition). Farnsworth, Clyde H., "New Debt Relief Policy." New  York Times, 
December 31, 1987,  al Al, col. 1 (late city edition). Bennett, Robert A,, "Bil- 
lions in Plan in Mexico Bond Sale," New  York Times, February 26, 1988, at 
39,  col. 4.  The  Treasury's role in this arrangement is not entirely clear-it took 
steps to facilitate the transaction, but it does not appear that the Treasuds 
initial role was more than that of  a facilitator. Cf.  Bennett, Robert A., "Lesson 
on  Mexican Debt," New  York Times, March 5, 1988, at 15,  col. 1.  Citations to 
the New  York Times are to the national edition unless otherwise indicated. 
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hindered by accounting rulings that appar- 
ently required banks to charge off or 
reserve against all Mexican debt tendered 
at the auction at the rate of discount ten- 
dered, regardless of whether the tender 
was accepted. In fact, at the debt auction 
held early in March 1988, only $3.7 billion 
of debt was accepted, at an average price 
of 69.77 cents per dollar, for $2.6 billion of 
bonds, reducing Mexico's debt by only 
$1.1 billion. 
The applicability of the Mexican bond approach 
to the immediate debt-service problems of other 
countries is not yet clear. For one thing, it 
requires foreign currency reserves to purchase 
the U.S. Treasury or other similiar securities that 
would support any new bond issue, and most 
LDC  debtors besides Mexico lack comparable 
amounts of foreign exchange. 
Also, a Mexican-style bonds-for-debt auction 
probably would require creditors to accept bonds 
for significantly less than the face value of the 
debt and to recognize the loss. Nevertheless, the 
Mexican proposal is another encouraging exam- 
ple of the search for solutions that is under way. 
Solutions obviously will vary from debtor to 
debtor and from lender to lender. In April 1988, 
Brazil conducted a debt-for-equity swap variation 
of the Mexican bonds-for-debt auction, exchang- 
ing $150 million of equity in designated Brazilian 
enterprises for $186 million of foreign debt at 
discounts ranging from 10 to 27 per cent below 
par value. 
VI.  Conclusion 
The LDC  debt crisis is not significantly closer to a 
permanent, global solution today than in 1982. 
By creditor-country measures, such as LDC  debt 
as a percentage of total banks' capital, the prob- 
lem of the U.S. banking system is only half as 
severe as in 1982, but the remaining problem is 
still highly concentrated in seven of the nine 
largest money-center banks. For most U.S. 
regional banks, the LDC debt crisis now is a 
problem no more severe, proportionately, than 
domestic credit problems. 
For the debtor countries, the problem remains 
as severe as ever. For example, real wages in 
Mexico declined 34 percent below 1982 levels 
by 1985 and have continued to decline since 
then.15 Domestic inflation (more than 150 per- 
cent per annum) and currency depreciation 
(more than 100 percent per annum) were increas- 
ing rapidly in three of the four large debtor 
countries at year-end 1987, and debt-service 
indicators deteriorated in most LDCs throughout 
the 1982-1987  period. Because of the new-money 
loans, the external debt now exceeds 50 percent 
of gross national product in all but four of the 15 
heavily indebted countries. From the debtors' 
standpoints, great sacrifices have been made, but 
there is as yet very little to show for them. 
Effective remedies may not, in the end,  depend 
crucially on large-scale, government-directed 
plans. The market valuation of banking firms will 
reflect expectations of the banks' future earnings, 
regardless of the banks' actual loan-loss provi- 
sions or LDC  debt charge-offs. To a large extent, 
financial markets have already discounted the 
value of LDC  loans on the books of banks. 
Market recognition of the substantial risks that 
could impede eventual debt service probably 
will continue to prompt banks to reserve further 
(in accordance with the perceived market value 
of LDC  debts), to raise capital, and perhaps also 
to reexamine dividend policies. And debtors and 
creditors alike seem likely to continue to explore 
cooperative solutions that recognize the neces- 
sity of compromises in the terms, maturities, and 
principal amounts of the debts. 
15  Real  wage changes were computed by dividing the local currency 
wage index and consumer price index for  1985:lP by the same indices for 
1982 (annual averages). International Monetary Fund.  International Financial 
Statistics 350 (June 1987). 
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by James M. Hvidding 
In a recent issue of this Review, Bryan and Gavin 
(1986a) hereinafter referred to as GB, compared 
the forecast accuracy of three alternative series of 
inflation forecasts: the Livingston survey of 
Economists' CPI forecasts, the Michigan survey of 
household inflation expectations, and a gener- 
ated series of out-of-sample time-series forecasts 
of the inflation rate. They concluded that the 
household survey is a more accurate forecast of 
inflation than the Livingston survey of econo- 
mists' forecasts but that "the relatively simple 
time-series model  ...p  erformed about as well as 
the Michigan survey." This note addresses the 
second part of this conclusion. 
The BG study was designed primarily to com- 
pare the Livingston and Michigan surveys. Since 
these two surveys measure different expecta- 
tions, some compromises had to be made. First, 
in fairness to the semiannual Livingston survey, 
half the observations from the quarterly Michigan 
While the Economic Review primarily contains articles by economists asso- 
ciated with the Bank or  the Board of  Governors, occasionally we receive 
comments from readers that are appropriate for the Review. Prof. Hvidding's 
comment on an earlier Review article by Michael Bryan and William Gavin is 
one such case. 
This comment extends Bryan and Gavin's earlier Economic Review article 
(1986 Quarter 3) on measuring inflation expectations. Using a different fre- 
quency of observations, Prof. Hvidding's results support Bryan and Gavin's 
findings that the Michigan Survey dominates the Livingston Survey as a 
forecast of  inflation. Using quarterly observations, he finds, however, that the 
Michigan survey forecasts inflation slightly better than the time series 
method, while Bryan and Gavin find the opposite using semiannual data. 
-  Editor 
James M. Hvidding is an associate professor of  economics at Kutztown Uni- 
versity in Kutztown, Pennsylvania. 
survey had to be ignored. Second, a choice had 
to be made whether to treat the forecasts as June 
to  June (Livingston) or May to May (Michigan).' 
Given the outcome of the study, BG made the 
correct choice in picking June to June. Handicap- 
ping the Michigan survey in this way strengthens 
their primary conclusion that the Michigan sur- 
vey is superior to the Livingston survey. But 
using only half of the available observations and 
measuring forecast accuracy on the wrong fore- 
cast horizon is not appropriate if the objective is 
to compare the Michigan survey with a gener- 
ated alternative forecast. 
To provide a more appropriate comparison of 
the Michigan survey and the generated forecast, I 
generated out-of-sample time-series forecasts for 
both the June to  June and May to May forecast 
periods using a seasonally adjusted CPI series 
supplied to me by BG. Using semiannual obser- 
vations on the June to  June series, I was able to 
replicate their results almost exactly. These 
results are reported in tables l(a) and 2(a).* I 
then repeated the forecast comparison using 
rn  1  The  Livingston survey is conducted semiannually in June and 
December and asks its respondents to forecast the level of the Consumer 
Price Index for  the following June or  December. The forecasts are therefore 
"June to June" (or December to December). The  Michigan survey is taken 
quarterly in February, May, August, and November. Here the respondents are  rn  2  BG  did not present  figures for the "naive" forecast (the inflation rate for 
asked to predict what will happen to the prices of  the things they buy "over  the year preceding the forecast date). It is included here to facilitate compari- 
the next  twelve months." The  forecasts are from February to February, May to  son between the semiannual data used by BG  and the quarterly data pre- 
May, and so on.  sented here. 
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Forecast  MAE  RMSE  U  uM  uR  uD 
Naive  2.205  2.744  1.000  0.000  0.197  0.802 
Livingston  2.303  3.006  1.096  0.203  0.015  0.782 
Michigan  1.871  2.362  0.861  0.037  0.000  0.963 
Time-Series  1.870  2.335  0.851  0.018  0.107  0.876 
(b) Quarterly Observations:  June 1966 -June 1988 
Forecast  MAE  RMSE  U  uM  uR  uD 
Naive  2.164  2.663  1.000  0.000  0.188  0.812 
Michigan  1.612  2.030  0.762  0.026  0.020  0.954 
Time-Series  1.823  2.301  0.864  0.000  0.179  0.821 
KEY: 
MAE -  Mean absolute error. 
RMSE -  Root mean squared error. 
U -  Ratio of forecast RMSE  to naive forecast FMSE. 
uM -  Fraction of forecast error due to bias. 
uR -  Fraction of forecast error due to difference of regression coefficient from unity. 
uD -  Fraction of forecast error due to residual variance. 
SOURCE: Author. 
quarterly observations on the May to May series3 
These results are reported in tables l(b) and 
2(b). Table l(b) reports measures of forecast 
accuracy for quarterly observations on the Michi- 
gan survey and the May to May time-series fore- 
cast over the period covered in BG. Here the 
Michigan survey is shown to be noticeably more 
accurate that the time-series forecast. 
In addition to the standard measures of fore- 
cast accuracy, BG presented the results of a con- 
ditional efficiency test employing the regression 
equation: 
3  The  generated time-series forecast used by BG (and reported in tables 
1 (a) and 2(a)) is actually a forecast of the change in the log of  the  CPI, 
which, as BG explicitly note, is only an approximation of  the annual percentage 
change in the CPI. It just happens that this approximation makes the time- 
series forecast appear to be more accurate than it really is.  When the delta-log 
forecasts are converted to percentage change forecasts, the  RMSE for the 
semiannual time-series forecast is 2.407, as opposed to the 2.335 reported in 
table l(a). The  time-series forecasts used in generating the results reported in 
table l(b) and 2(b) have been converted to annual percent change forecasts. 
where rr, is the inflation rate and the  *,  are n 
linearly independent forecasts of w, . Forecast 
i is "conditionally efficient" relative to the other 
forecast if  pi  = 1 and p, =  0 for all j i.  Table 
2(a) shows that the hypothesis that the Living- 
ston survey is conditionally efficient relative to 
the Michigan survey and the time-series forecast 
can be rejected at the one percent significance 
level for the June observations (equation [I]  ) 
and at the five percent level of significance for 
the December observations (equation [2]  ). The 
conditional efficiency hypothesis is not rejected 
in either equation for the Michigan survey or the 
time-series forecast. These findings lead BG to 
conclude that the household survey and the 
time-series forecasts are statistically comparable. 
In conducting their conditional efficiency test, 
BG divided the sample of semiannual observa- 
tions into two series of annual observations and 
ran two separate regressions. This treatment is 
used in order to avoid the serially correlated 
error term that inevitably arises when the sam- 
pling interval is less than the forecast horizon. 
Hansen and Hodrick (1980) have demonstrated 
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Annual  ~uarterlyb 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Time Period  June 66 -  Dec 66-  66:2-85:2  66:2-85:2 
June 85  Dec 84 
Constant  0.161  3.070  0.139  -0.195 
(0.09)  (1.58)  (0.18)  (0.25) 
Naive  (-0.347) 
(0.67) 
Test Statistic
a  32.48 
(.OOO) 
Livingston  -0.291  0.022 
(0.69)  (0.04) 
Test Statistic
a  5.67  3.28 
(.005)  (.040) 
Michigan  0.784  -0.591  0.715  0.757 
(1.73)  (0.73)  (1.29)  (1.24) 
Test Statistic
a  0.83  1.50  6.25  2.62 
(.526)  (.252)  (.181)  (.454) 
Time-Series  0.495  1.124  0.63  1  0.297 
(1.27)  (2.33)  (1.13)  (0.72) 
Test Statistic
a  1.43  0.67  14.24  11.56 
(.269)  (.622)  (.007)  (.009) 
No. of Obs.  20  19  77  77 
R2  .674  .507  .64  1  .627 
Durbin-Watson  1.560  1.239  0.838  0.621 
NOTE:  t-statistics for coefficients and significance levels for test statistics are in parentheses. 
a.  For the joint hypothesis that thecoefficient is oneandall other coefficients in the regression  are zero.  For equations usingannual  data this isan 
F-statistic. For equations using quarterly data it is Chi-square as suggested by Hansen and Hodrick (1980). 
b.  The t-statistics  for the equations using quarterly data are derived from the adjusted standard errors as suggested by Hansen and Hodrick (  1980). 
SOURCE: Author 
an alternative approach that is asymptotically 
more efficient. Their treatment includes all 
observations in the OLS regression and employs 
an estimate of the implied autocovariances of 
the residuals to calculate a Chi-square statistic for 
hypotheses concerning restrictions on the 
regression  coefficient^.^  Table 2(b) reports the 
results of conditional efficiency tests employing 
all quarterly observations on the forecast series. 
a  4  For a description of  this testing procedure and an  illustration of its use 
in this context see Brown and Maital (1981) or  Bryan and Gavin (1986b). 
The naive forecast (last year's inflation rate) is 
included in equation (3) to replace the Living- 
ston series so that the three-way test employed 
by BG is preserved. Here the hypotheses that the 
naive and time-series forecasts are conditionally 
efficient relative to the Michigan survey are 
strongly rejected while the hypothesis that the 
Michigan survey is conditionally efficient cannot 
be rejected. Equation (4) shows that the same 
conclusion holds for a two-way conditional effi- 
ciency test. 
These results demonstrate that the Michigan 
survey measure of the inflation expectations of 
households dominates a single ARIMA time- 
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forecasts are not appropriate proxies for house- 
hold inflation expectations in quarterly econo- 
metric models. Another interesting implication 
follows from the observation that the generated 
forecast used here makes use of the CPI data for 
the survey month, that is, first-quarter forecasts 
use the current February value of the CPI, 
second-quarter forecasts the May value, and so 
on. The fact that this information is not officially 
published until more than a month after the 
Michigan survey is taken, together with the find- 
ing that the Michigan survey is conditionally efi. 
cient relative to this forecast implies that house- 
holds are not dependent on published indexes 
for information on prices and inflation. 
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